The Probability Desk — Thursday, July 2, 2026
Base cases. Tail risks. Second-order effects. For capital that thinks in decades.
The Trigger
At 8:30 a.m. ET this morning, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that U.S. nonfarm payrolls rose by 57,000 in June — against a Dow Jones consensus of 115,000 — while the unemployment rate edged down to 4.2% (from 4.3% in May). April was revised down to +148,000 and May to +129,000, taking 74,000 jobs out of the prior two months. Source: BLS, The Employment Situation — June 2026, USDL-26-1125, July 2, 2026. Source: CNBC, July 2, 2026.
The headline miss is not the story. Three internals are:
- The labor force is shrinking. Participation fell 0.3 percentage point to 61.5% — its lowest since March 2021 — and has now fallen a full point since November 2025 (62.5% → 61.5%, FRED CIVPART). The employment-population ratio slipped to 59.0%. The unemployment rate is stable at 4.2% in large part because the denominator is contracting, not because hiring is healthy. Source: BLS, July 2, 2026; FRED, CIVPART.
- The trend is near stall speed. BLS itself notes June's +57,000 is "roughly in line with the average monthly change over the prior 12 months (+36,000)." A +36k trailing average is the weakest sustained pace of this cycle. Long-term unemployed (27+ weeks) are up 286,000 over the year to 1.9 million — 27.3% of all unemployed. Leisure and hospitality shed 61,000 jobs in a month. Source: BLS, July 2, 2026.
- This lands on a Federal Reserve that just turned hawkish. At the June 16–17 meeting — Chair Kevin Warsh's first — the FOMC held the target range at 3.50–3.75% unanimously, and the dot plot flipped: 9 of 18 participants now project a year-end 2026 rate above the current midpoint, 8 at it, and only 1 below. Source: Federal Reserve, FOMC statement, June 17, 2026; Yahoo Finance, June 2026; CNBC, June 17, 2026.
The reason the Committee is hawkish while payrolls stall: May headline CPI ran 4.2% year over year — a three-year high — with energy up 23.5% y/y and gasoline up 40.5% y/y. But core CPI was 2.9%, and energy accounted for over sixty percent of May's monthly increase. Source: BLS, Consumer Price Index — May 2026, June 10, 2026; CNBC, June 10, 2026.
For a decade-horizon balance sheet, today is the day the two halves of the dual mandate formally moved in opposite directions: measured inflation at a three-year high, measured hiring near stall speed, and a new Fed chair whose first dot plot leans toward a hike. Both sides of every duration, credit, and currency position in a universal-owner portfolio now depend on which mandate wins.
Today's market reaction was immediate but measured: the 2-year Treasury yield fell more than 5 basis points to 4.108%, and the 10-year eased about 1 basis point to roughly 4.467%. BMO's head of U.S. rates strategy Ian Lyngen: "Overall, this morning's data makes it difficult to envision a path toward a July Fed hike even if there is upside in the inflation data yet to be realized." Source: CNBC, July 2, 2026.
The Forecast Question
Will the FOMC's federal funds target range be below 3.50–3.75% after its December 8–9, 2026 meeting — i.e., will the Fed deliver at least one 25bp cut in the second half of 2026?
Horizon: December 9, 2026 (four scheduled meetings remain: July 28–29, September, October, December). Resolution: the Federal Reserve's post-meeting implementation note. Base rate and market pricing below. What would change the call: two consecutive negative payroll prints, a headline CPI print ≥4.5%, or an unemployment rate ≥4.6% — see the Watch Dashboard.
Prior / Base Rate
The reference class: Fed behavior in the six-to-twelve months after headline inflation above 4% collided with visibly deteriorating employment. Four labelled analogues (historical values approximate, from FRED historical series):
1974–75 — labor won. With inflation above 10% and unemployment rising from ~5.1% toward 8%+, the Burns Fed cut the funds rate from roughly 13% (mid-1974) to near 5% by mid-1975. When labor broke decisively, the Fed eased into double-digit inflation.
1979–80 — inflation won. The Volcker Fed hiked into a recession, accepting rising unemployment to break entrenched inflation. The distinguishing feature versus 1974: inflation expectations had become unanchored and wage growth was tracking prices.
2008 — labor (and stress) won. Headline CPI peaked at 5.6% in July 2008 on $145 oil; the Fed held its 2% policy rate through the September 16 meeting and cut aggressively from October 8 as employment and the financial system broke. Energy-driven headline inflation did not prevent easing once labor deteriorated.
2011 — the closest analogue: nobody won; the Fed looked through it. Headline CPI peaked near 3.9% in September 2011 on an oil spike while core stayed near 2%; the Bernanke Fed never hiked, never cut the (already-zero) rate, and eased via maturity extension. Energy-led headline inflation with contained core was treated as transitory.
The discipline of the outside view: in this class, the Fed hiked into the weakness only once (1979–80), and that required unanchored expectations and a wage-price spiral. Today, average hourly earnings are running 3.5% y/y — decelerating, not spiraling Source: BLS, July 2, 2026 — and the 10-year breakeven inflation rate sits at 2.23% Source: FRED, T10YIE, July 1, 2026, i.e., the bond market is treating the CPI spike as an energy-driven level shift, not a regime change. But the class also shows the Fed rarely cuts while headline is still above 4% absent a labor break you can see in the unemployment rate — and at 4.2%, this one is masked by falling participation. Rough class frequencies over a two-quarter window: ease ~40%, hold ~40%, tighten ~20% — with the caveat that four analogues is a thin class (low confidence; stated as discipline, not precision).
The Evidence-Update Table
Prior (base rate, class above): Cut 40 / Hold 40 / Hike 20.
| # | Evidence (cited) | Direction | Strength | Posterior after update |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | June dot plot: 9/18 participants above current midpoint; median YE2026 near 3.8% (Fed SEP via Yahoo, Jun 17–18) | → Hold/Hike | Strong | Cut 28 / Hold 47 / Hike 25 |
| 2 | May headline CPI 4.2% y/y, 3-yr high (BLS, Jun 10) | → Hold/Hike | Strong | Cut 24 / Hold 49 / Hike 27 |
| 3 | Core CPI 2.9%; energy >60% of the May m/m rise; AHE 3.5% and slowing (BLS CPI; BLS empsit) | → against Hike | Strong | Cut 26 / Hold 51 / Hike 23 |
| 4 | Brent back at $71.59 (Jun 29) vs the June spike — the energy wedge mechanically decays into H2 base effects (FRED, DCOILBRENTEU) | → Cut, against Hike | Moderate | Cut 29 / Hold 52 / Hike 19 |
| 5 | Today: payrolls +57k vs 115k consensus; −74k revisions; 12m avg +36k (BLS, Jul 2) | → Cut | Strong | Cut 33 / Hold 50 / Hike 17 |
| 6 | Participation −1.0pp since Nov 2025 to 61.5%: u-rate stability is denominator-driven, so the trigger the Fed watches (u ≥ 4.6%) may fire late or not at all (FRED CIVPART; BLS) | → Hold (delays the cut trigger) | Moderate | Cut 30 / Hold 53 / Hike 17 |
| 7 | 2-yr yield 4.14% (Jun 30 close; 4.108% post-print today) sits ~51bp above the 3.63% effective funds rate — the market itself prices net hike risk over two years (FRED DGS2, DFF, Jun 30) | → Hold/Hike | Moderate | Cut 29 / Hold 52 / Hike 19 |
| 8 | Post-print: 2Y −5bp+, July hike "difficult to envision" (Lyngen, BMO, CNBC, Jul 2) | → against near-term Hike | Moderate | Cut 30 / Hold 52 / Hike 18 |
The final published weights fold this Bayesian read together with the Monte Carlo below under the Desk's standing aggregation rule (methodology box). No probability in this report appears without the evidence row or simulation output that moved it.
The Scenarios
Weights sum to 100%. Rounded to 5% by house rule.
Base — "The Long Hold" — 50%
The Fed holds 3.50–3.75% through December. Headline CPI decays mechanically toward ~3–3.5% as the energy wedge rolls off (Brent at $71.59 is already back near its pre-spike level), core stays sticky near 3%, and the labor market keeps deteriorating slowly — monthly payrolls in the 0–75k range, unemployment drifting to 4.3–4.5% but never printing the clean break a 4.6%+ number would give doves. Warsh, in his first year, prizes credibility over fine-tuning; a 130-word statement regime is built for saying nothing. The economy grinds; neither mandate wins cleanly; policy does nothing.
Trigger: headline CPI prints between 3.3% and 4.3% through Q3 while payrolls stay positive. Resolving indicator: the December implementation note showing an unchanged 3.50–3.75% range.
Upside (for duration) — "The Labor Break" — 30%
The June internals are the leading edge: falling participation is demand weakness in disguise, the 3-month payroll average goes negative by September–October (our simulation puts a 32% probability on a negative 3-month average by year-end), unemployment prints 4.6%+, and the energy base effect pulls headline below 3.5% by the October meeting. The Fed cuts 25bp in October or December — the "risk-management" cut re-priced from impossible to done in about eight weeks, as in 2024. Duration rallies hard from a 4.44% 10-year; the 2s pricing 48bp of hikes above the funds rate unwinds violently.
Trigger: a negative payroll print or u ≥ 4.6% alongside headline CPI ≤ 3.5%. Resolving indicator: a December (or earlier) target range of 3.25–3.50% or lower.
Tail — "The Warsh Hike" — 20%
Energy re-spikes (our Brent simulation's 90th percentile is ~$95) or tariff pass-through lifts core above 3%; headline holds above 4% into the fall; the September dot plot majority converts into a 25bp hike in October or December — the first hike delivered into a sub-100k payroll trend since 1979–80. This is the scenario almost no institutional portfolio is structured for: policy tightening into labor weakness, a bear-flattening then re-steepening rates shock, credit spreads off a 274bp HY OAS base (a level with almost no cushion — FRED, BAMLH0A0HYM2, July 1, 2026), and an equity de-rating led by long-duration growth.
Trigger: headline CPI ≥ 4.0% with core ≥ 3.0% at a meeting where unemployment is still ≤ 4.4%. Resolving indicator: any 2026 implementation note raising the range to 3.75–4.00%.
The Monte Carlo
A real simulation, run today (code shipped alongside this report as mc.py; outputs in mc-output.txt). 50,000 paths, monthly steps July–December 2026, seed 20260702, numpy.
Design. Payroll growth follows an AR(1) around an uncertain trend (trend ~ N(+36k, 30k) — the trailing-12-month average from today's BLS release, with the trend itself a source of variance; innovation σ = 100k, versus ~118k realized std of the last twelve monthly changes in FRED PAYEMS, part of which is revision noise). Unemployment responds to the payroll gap against a low ~40k breakeven (the falling-participation regime) plus household-survey noise. Headline CPI = sticky core (AR around 2.9%) + an energy wedge starting at 1.3pp that decays at 15%/month (base effects) and responds to a Brent GBM (σ = 35%/yr from $71.59). The policy rule is a stylized hawkish-chair reaction function evaluated at the four remaining meetings: cut if the 3-month payroll average ≤ 0 or u ≥ 4.6%, and headline ≤ 3.5% or ≥0.8pp off its peak; hike if headline ≥ 4.0% and core ≥ 3.0% while u ≤ 4.4% and payrolls ≥ 50k.
Results (50,000 paths):
| Output | Value |
|---|---|
| P(≥1 cut by December 2026) | 24.6% |
| P(≥1 hike by December 2026) | 13.1% |
| P(hold through December) | 62.3% |
| Year-end unemployment, P10/P50/P90 | 3.8% / 4.2% / 4.6% |
| Peak unemployment on path, P50/P90 | 4.3% / 4.7% |
| Year-end headline CPI, P10/P50/P90 | 3.0% / 3.4% / 3.9% |
| Year-end Brent, P10/P50/P90 | $51 / $70 / $95 |
| P(3-month payroll average ≤ 0 at year-end) | 32.3% |
| P(u ≥ 4.6% at any point) | 13.0% |
What drives it: the hold dominates because the two triggers rarely fire together — in most paths where labor breaks, headline hasn't fallen far enough yet for a hawkish Committee to move; in most paths where inflation stays hot, labor hasn't visibly broken. Limitations: the reaction function is a stylized rule, not the Committee; correlations between Brent, payrolls, and participation are simplified; the participation trend (a policy-driven labor-supply shock) is modeled as drift, not as a regime variable; and no financial-stress channel is included (which historically accelerates cuts — this biases the cut probability down).
Aggregation to published weights (house rule, methodology box): base rate 0.4 × (40/40/20) + expert priors 0.3 × (15/55/30) + simulation 0.3 × (24.6/62.3/13.1) → Cut 27.9 / Hold 51.2 / Hike 20.9 → rounded to 5%: Cut 30 / Hold 50 / Hike 20. Expert-prior inputs: the June SEP dot distribution (Fed/Yahoo, Jun 17–18); prediction-market pricing of roughly 80% "zero cuts in 2026" (Polymarket, accessed July 2, 2026, medium confidence — thin institutional venue); Goldman Sachs' published house view that the Fed is unlikely to cut this year (Goldman Sachs Insights, accessed July 2, 2026); and today's post-print strategist read (BMO via CNBC, Jul 2). MiroFish multi-agent run: unavailable this episode — two analytic inputs plus the Monte Carlo, as recorded in the desk worksheet.
Market vs. Desk View
What the market prices. Prediction markets put "zero cuts in 2026" near 80% (Polymarket, accessed Jul 2); the 2-year note at 4.14% (June 30 close) trades ~51bp above the 3.63% effective funds rate — still ~48bp after today's post-print slip to 4.108% — a curve that embeds net tightening risk (FRED DGS2/DFF, Jun 30; CNBC, Jul 2); 10-year breakevens at 2.23% say the inflation spike is energy, not regime (FRED T10YIE, Jul 1); VIX at 16.6 and HY spreads at 274bp price essentially no macro accident (FRED VIXCLS, BAMLH0A0HYM2, Jul 1).
Where the Desk differs. The Desk puts the cut at 30% versus roughly 20% market-implied — the labor internals (participation −1.0pp in seven months, long-term unemployment +286k y/y, a +36k trend) are consistent with a labor market that is materially weaker than the 4.2% unemployment rate advertises, and the energy wedge decays on its own arithmetic into Q4. Symmetrically, the Desk's 20% hike weight is below what the dot plot's 9-of-18 implies if taken at face value: dots are projections, not votes, and today's print — per BMO — has already taken July off the table. The highest-conviction mispricing is not the funds rate at all: it is 274bp of high-yield spread and a 16.6 VIX coexisting with a 20% probability (our weight) of the first hike-into-weakness since 1979–80. Credit is priced for The Long Hold only.
What would prove the Desk wrong: payrolls re-accelerating above ~150k with participation stabilizing (kills the cut case); headline CPI ≥ 4.5% with core ≥ 3.2% (moves the hike from tail to base).
The Universal-Owner Portfolio Heatmap
Direction and rough magnitude of the reprice by scenario, 6–12 month view. Analytical, not advisory.
| Asset class | Base: Long Hold (50%) | Upside: Labor Break (30%) | Tail: Warsh Hike (20%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global equities | Sideways grind; multiple capped by 4.4% 10Y (±5%) | +5–10% initial relief, then earnings question | −10–20%, long-duration growth leads down |
| Rates / duration | Carry, range 4.2–4.6% 10Y | 10Y toward 3.9–4.1%; front end rallies hardest | 10Y through 4.75%+; bear flattener first |
| Credit (IG/HY) | Spreads drift wider off 274bp; carry positive | Modest widening on growth fear, offset by rates | HY +150–250bp; issuance window closes |
| FX (USD, broad index 120.9) | Firm — highest-carry major stays bid | −3–6% broad USD; EM local debt relief | Spike higher, then credibility question |
| Commodities / energy | Brent $60–80 range | Softer on demand | Likely the cause: Brent $95+ paths |
| Real assets / infrastructure | Discount rates pinned; deals reprice slowly | Cap-rate relief; transaction volume returns | Marks fall; refinancing walls bind |
| Private equity / private credit | Exit drought persists; NAV lag continues | Distribution cycle restarts | Floating-rate stress; default cycle in levered credits |
| Gold / reserves | Supported by negative real-rate drift expectations | Rallies on cut cycle | Ambiguous: real rates up vs. policy-error hedge bid |
The structural point for universal owners: at 50%, the modal outcome is nothing happens to the policy rate for another six months — which means the entire return distribution is carried by what happens to term premium, spreads, and the currency, not the funds rate. Positioning that needs a policy move to work has a 50% chance of paying negative carry to wait.
Second- and Third-Order Effects
The participation channel becomes the macro story of 2027. A labor force shrinking ~1pp in seven months while measured unemployment stays flat means potential growth is being marked down in real time. Second order: trend GDP estimates fall → the neutral rate debate reopens → every SEP from here fights over r* with a smaller economy. Third order: pension and insurance actuaries discount liabilities against a structurally lower-growth, higher-inflation-volatility regime — the exact combination that made the 1970s the worst decade on record for real funded ratios.
The credibility trade migrates to the long end. If the Fed holds while headline runs 4%, it is implicitly tolerating above-target inflation to protect employment optionality; if it hikes into +36k payrolls, it is repeating the single rarest move in its modern history. Either way, the uncertainty premium lodges in 10s and 30s — term premium, already positive with the 2s10s at +31bp (FRED T10Y2Y, Jul 1), has room to build. Sovereign funds and reserve managers holding the long end of the curve are the marginal absorbers.
Fiscal arithmetic tightens quietly. Every quarter at 3.50–3.75% instead of the 3.4% year-end median the March dots implied rolls U.S. debt service higher; a hike scenario compounds it. Third order: Treasury supply skews to bills → money-market ecosystems swell further → the funding system's sensitivity to any future hike grows.
The Gulf window. Energy-led inflation with a Fed unable to cut is, mechanically, a transfer to hydrocarbon exporters with dollar pegs: import inflation moderate, export revenue elevated, funding costs high but hedged by the revenue side. Sovereign buyers with 2026–27 deployment calendars (the fastest-growing pool of capital in private markets) face less competition from levered Western buyers for as long as The Long Hold runs.
Labor-supply politics feed back into inflation. If participation decline is partly policy-driven (immigration enforcement, benefit design), the same politics that shrink labor supply raise wage floors in the sectors that remain short — a slow-burn structural inflation channel that survives the energy wedge's decay and keeps core sticky near 3%.
Watch Dashboard
Thresholds that resolve the scenario set. Current readings as of July 2, 2026.
| # | Indicator | Current | Threshold that changes the model | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Nonfarm payrolls, monthly (BLS, next: Aug 7) | +57k | Single print < 0 | → Labor Break |
| 2 | 3-month payroll average | +111k (Apr–Jun revised) | ≤ 0 | → Labor Break |
| 3 | Unemployment rate | 4.2% | ≥ 4.6% | → Labor Break |
| 4 | Labor force participation | 61.5% | Two more −0.2pp months | → potential-growth markdown |
| 5 | Headline CPI y/y (next: mid-July) | 4.2% (May) | ≥ 4.5% → hike risk; ≤ 3.5% → cut window opens | Both |
| 6 | Core CPI y/y | 2.9% (May) | ≥ 3.2% | → Warsh Hike |
| 7 | Average hourly earnings y/y | 3.5% | ≥ 4.0% (spiral evidence) | → Warsh Hike |
| 8 | Brent crude | $71.59 (Jun 29) | ≥ $90 sustained | → Warsh Hike |
| 9 | 2Y Treasury vs. effective funds (3.63%) | 4.11% (+48bp) | 2Y < funds rate | Market flips to cut pricing |
| 10 | 10Y breakeven (T10YIE) | 2.23% | ≥ 2.6% | Expectations unanchoring |
| 11 | HY OAS | 274bp | ≥ 400bp | Stress channel accelerates cuts |
| 12 | VIX | 16.6 | ≥ 25 sustained | Stress channel |
| 13 | July 28–29 FOMC statement language | 130-word format | Any reference to "labor market softening" | → Labor Break |
| 14 | September SEP dots | 9/18 above midpoint | Median falls back below 3.63% | Hike tail deflates |
| 15 | August 28 preliminary payroll benchmark revision (BLS pre-announced) | — | Large negative revision | → Labor Break (historically underappreciated) |
Red-Team — How This Could Be Wrong
1. The unemployment rate may be telling the truth. The Desk reads falling participation as hidden weakness; the sharpest counter is that it is a supply shock — demographics plus immigration policy — in which case 4.2% really is a tight market, wage pressure re-accelerates from 3.5%, and the hike scenario deserves the dot plot's ~50% rather than our 20%. Falsifier: average hourly earnings re-accelerating toward 4% while the u-rate holds — watch rows 3, 4, 7.
2. The energy-decay assumption is doing heavy lifting. Our base and cut cases both lean on headline CPI gliding down as the 2025–26 energy spike rolls out of the twelve-month window with Brent at ~$71. One Strait-of-Hormuz-class event re-prices that instantly — our own simulation gives Brent a 10% chance of ~$95+ by year-end, and this desk's morning risk board has run Hormuz-adjacent probabilities near coin-flip territory all summer. If energy re-spikes, "The Warsh Hike" is under-weighted at 20%.
3. Four analogues is not a base rate. The reference class (1974, 1979, 2008, 2011) is honest but thin, and none features this configuration: a new chair, a shrinking labor force, and inflation that is high in headline but on-target-adjacent in core. If the class is uninformative, the published weights lean harder on a stylized simulation and house priors than the format admits. We flag this openly rather than manufacture false precision — it is why the weights are rounded to 5% and why the December question, not a point path, is the forecast.
Methodology Box
Probabilities are the UAO Probability Desk's, weighted across base-rate, expert-prior, and simulation inputs under a written aggregation rule (base rate 0.4 / expert priors 0.3 / Monte Carlo 0.3; MiroFish multi-agent run unavailable this episode and recorded as such). The Monte Carlo is a real 50,000-path numpy simulation (seed 20260702; code and raw outputs ship with this report). Scenario weights are mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive, sum to 100%, and are rounded to the nearest 5% by house rule. Live figures pulled July 2, 2026 from FRED (rates, spreads, breakevens, oil, participation), BLS releases (employment, CPI), and the Federal Reserve. The full methodology file is available on request. Calibration: every published scenario is logged and Brier-scored as it resolves.
Editorial scenario analysis only. Not investment, actuarial, or geopolitical advice.
Source Ledger
| # | Source | Date | Data point used | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | BLS, The Employment Situation — June 2026 (USDL-26-1125) | 2026-07-02 | +57k; u 4.2%; LFPR 61.5%; revisions −74k; 12m avg +36k; AHE 3.5%; L&H −61k; LT unemployed +286k | H |
| 2 | BLS, Employment Situation PDF | 2026-07-02 | Same release, archival | H |
| 3 | CNBC, jobs report | 2026-07-02 | 115k Dow Jones consensus | M |
| 4 | Yahoo Finance, June jobs report | 2026-07-02 | Consensus miss confirmation | M |
| 5 | CNBC, bond market reaction | 2026-07-02 | 2Y −5bp to 4.108%; 10Y ~4.467%; Lyngen (BMO) quote | M |
| 6 | Federal Reserve, FOMC statement | 2026-06-17 | Unanimous hold, 3.50–3.75% | H |
| 7 | CNBC, Fed decision | 2026-06-17 | Unanimous vote; range | M |
| 8 | Yahoo Finance, dot plot | 2026-06 | 9/18 dots above midpoint; 8 at; 1 below | M |
| 9 | StockTitan, Fed June 2026 | 2026-06-17 | Dot plot flip; YE projections 3.6–4.1% | M |
| 10 | Chase Insights, Warsh first meeting | 2026-06 | 130-word statement; Warsh chair; no Warsh dot | M |
| 11 | BLS, CPI — May 2026 | 2026-06-10 | Headline 4.2% y/y, +0.5% m/m; energy +23.5% y/y; gasoline +40.5% y/y; energy >60% of m/m rise | H |
| 12 | CNBC, May CPI | 2026-06-10 | Core +0.2% m/m vs 0.3% est; core 2.9% y/y | M |
| 13 | Kiplinger, May CPI | 2026-06 | Fastest pace in 3 years | M |
| 14 | FRED, DGS2 | 2026-06-30 | 2Y 4.14% | H |
| 15 | FRED, DGS10 | 2026-06-30 | 10Y 4.44% | H |
| 16 | FRED, DFF | 2026-06-30 | Effective funds 3.63% | H |
| 17 | FRED, T10Y2Y | 2026-07-01 | 2s10s +31bp | H |
| 18 | FRED, VIXCLS | 2026-07-01 | VIX 16.59 | H |
| 19 | FRED, BAMLH0A0HYM2 | 2026-07-01 | HY OAS 274bp | H |
| 20 | FRED, T10YIE | 2026-07-01 | 10Y breakeven 2.23% | H |
| 21 | FRED, DTWEXBGS | 2026-06-26 | Broad dollar 120.89 | H |
| 22 | FRED, DCOILBRENTEU | 2026-06-29 | Brent $71.59 | H |
| 23 | FRED, WTI (DCOILWTICO) | 2026-06-29 | WTI $71.87 | H |
| 24 | FRED, PAYEMS | 2026-07-02 | Monthly changes; ~118k std of last 12 | H |
| 25 | FRED, CIVPART | 2026-07-02 | 62.5% (Nov 2025) → 61.5% (Jun 2026) | H |
| 26 | FRED, UNRATE | 2026-07-02 | 4.5% (Nov 2025) → 4.2% (Jun 2026) | H |
| 27 | Polymarket, Fed cuts 2026 | accessed 2026-07-02 | ~80% zero cuts in 2026 | M |
| 28 | Goldman Sachs Insights, rate-cut outlook | accessed 2026-07-02 | House view: unlikely to cut this year | M |
| 29 | CME FedWatch | accessed 2026-07-02 | Futures-implied meeting odds (reference tool) | M |
| 30 | Advisor Perspectives (dshort), Fed decision | 2026-06-18 | June decision recap | M |
| 31 | BLS, CPI April 2026 (archive) | 2026-05-12 | Prior-month CPI baseline | H |
| 32 | BLS, Employment Situation May 2026 (archive) | 2026-06-05 | May originally +172k, revised | H |
| 33 | BLS, release schedule | 2026 | Next empsit Aug 7; benchmark prelim Aug 28 | H |
| 34 | FRED historical: 1974–75, 1979–80, 2008, 2011 episodes (FEDFUNDS, CPIAUCSL, UNRATE) | historical | Analogue class values (approximate, labelled) | M |
| 35 | UAO Probability Desk simulation mc.py |
2026-07-02 | 50k-path outputs quoted |
Continue the briefing. Read the daily brief · watch the daily video briefing · listen to The Universal Owner · view the chart of the day.
Produced and edited by the UAO editorial desk. Not investment advice.