The Probability Desk — Tuesday, 9 June 2026
A probability-weighted scenario report from the UAO Probability Desk on the single number that prices every long-horizon liability on earth: the US 30-year Treasury yield.
Executive summary
The long bond is the spine of global capital. Almost every discount rate a universal owner applies — to a private-equity holding, a 30-year infrastructure concession, a defined-benefit liability, a sovereign reserve portfolio — borrows its starting point from the US 30-year Treasury yield. That number is now sitting at 5.01% (FRED DGS30, 5 June 2026) and eased to roughly 5.03% on Tuesday, holding the 5% line three weeks after spiking to an intraday 5.197% on 18–19 May — its highest level since July 2007, a nineteen-year peak.
The Desk's central judgement is that this is not a spike to be faded back to the 2010s. The decisive evidence is what kind of yield this is: the 30-year real yield (TIPS, DFII30) is 2.74%, while 30-year inflation compensation sits near 2.27% (the 10-year breakeven, 2.35%, is similarly contained) and the 5-year/5-year forward inflation swap is 2.23% (FRED, 8 June) — anchored. The move up the curve is being done by real rates and term premium, not by an un-anchoring of inflation expectations. That distinction is the whole report: a fiscal/term-premium repricing is far stickier than an inflation scare, because it does not require the Fed to "win" anything to persist.
The forecast question we put to the Desk: What is the probability that the 30-year Treasury yield averages above 5.00% over the twelve months to June 2027? Our ensemble — historical base rate, cited house views, and a 50,000-path Monte Carlo — puts that probability at 55% (the simulation alone returns 57.6%). We resolve the path distribution into three mutually exclusive scenarios:
- Base — "Higher Plateau" (50%): the 30Y spends the year ranging 4.80–5.30%, term premium entrenched but not spiralling.
- Upside for bondholders — "Orderly Normalization" (30%): disinflation resumes, the energy premium fades, growth cools, and the 30Y averages below 4.80%.
- Tail — "Term-Premium Spiral" (20%): a fiscal or auction accident, or an inflation re-acceleration, carries the average above 5.30% with touches of 5.5–6%.
Desk view in one paragraph. The market is pricing the long end as a temporary overshoot that the Fed and disinflation will eventually pull back. The Desk thinks the more likely state of the world is a structurally higher anchor — a 30Y that lives around 5% rather than visits it — driven by a 5.8%-of-GDP deficit, a public debt load passing 100% of GDP, record coupon supply, and a term premium that has only partly rebuilt. For universal owners, the most consequential second-order effect is counterintuitive and good: a permanently higher discount rate repairs defined-benefit funded status even as it compresses the value of every long-duration risk asset. The losers and winners are not who the headline "bond rout" framing implies.
Editorial scenario analysis only. Not investment, actuarial, or geopolitical advice.
The Trigger
On Tuesday 9 June 2026 the US 30-year Treasury yield traded around 5.03%, easing one basis point on the session but holding above the 5% threshold for a third consecutive week (Trading Economics, US 30-Year Bond Yield, 9 June 2026). The most recent clean settlement in the official series was 5.01% on 5 June (FRED, DGS30). This follows the 18–19 May episode in which the 30Y reached an intraday 5.197%, described across the financial press as the highest level since July 2007 — a nineteen-year high (CNN Business; CNBC; Reuters, 19 May 2026).
What makes the level a trigger rather than a data point is its composition and its persistence. Three weeks after a violent spike, the long bond has not mean-reverted to the 4.3–4.6% range that characterised most of 2024–2025. It has consolidated at 5%. And it has done so while the 20-year yield (5.03%) sits essentially on top of the 30-year and the 10-year (4.55%) trails well below — a curve whose steepness now lives at the very long end, the classic signature of a term-premium story rather than a monetary-policy story.
The Forecast Question
Will the US 30-year Treasury yield average above 5.00% over the twelve months ending June 2027?
- Horizon: 12 months (resolves end-June 2027).
- Resolution metric: the simple average of the daily DGS30 constant-maturity series over the window.
- Why it matters: the 30Y is the reference discount rate for the longest-dated liabilities and assets a universal owner holds. A sustained 5%+ anchor is a different planning regime from a 4% anchor — it changes target funding ratios, private-market entry multiples, the strategic case for duration, and the very definition of the equity risk premium.
- What would change the call: a decisive growth shock (recession pulls the long end down via flight-to-quality and rate-cut pricing), a credible multi-year fiscal consolidation, or conversely a failed auction / inflation re-acceleration that breaks the range upward.
Prior and Base-Rate Analogues
The outside view starts with frequency, not narrative.
Analogue 1 — The pre-GFC "normal" (2003–2007). The last time the 30Y sat sustainably at 5% was the mid-2000s, when 5–5.25% was an unremarkable resting level for the long bond. Relevance: it reminds us that 5% is not historically extreme; the 2010s were the anomaly, not the 2020s. Why it may mislead: that regime had a smaller debt-to-GDP ratio and a Fed funds rate above 5%; today's 5% long bond coexists with a policy rate the market expects to fall.
Analogue 2 — October 2023, the head-fake (≈5.18% 30Y). In autumn 2023 the 30Y briefly pierced 5% on term-premium and supply fears, then collapsed roughly 100bp into year-end as the Fed pivoted dovish. Relevance: the single best evidence for the Normalization scenario — long-end spikes driven by term premium can reverse hard and fast. Why it may mislead: the 2023 reversal required a dovish Fed pivot and a soft-landing growth narrative; the fiscal backdrop has since deteriorated, and inflation in 2026 is running hotter (headline PCE 3.8% y/y, core 3.3%) than the disinflation of late 2023.
Analogue 3 — The UK gilt / LDI crisis (September 2022). A self-reinforcing spiral in which rising long yields forced leveraged liability-hedging funds to sell the very bonds they were hedging with, until the central bank intervened. Relevance: the template for the Tail scenario — a term-premium move that becomes a forced-selling accident. Why it may mislead: US Treasury market plumbing, buyer base, and LDI leverage differ materially from the UK's; the analogue sets the mechanism, not the probability.
Base-rate reading. Across the post-2022 regime, the 30Y has spent a steadily rising share of its time at or above 5%, and it enters this window starting at 5.01%. The outside-view frequency of "averages above 5% over a forward year," conditioned on this regime and this starting point, is moderate-to-likely — we anchor the base-rate input at roughly 0.50 for the Higher Plateau, with the 2023 reversal keeping a real 0.28 weight on Normalization and the structural fiscal pressure supporting a 0.18 base-rate weight on the Spiral tail.
Evidence-Update Table
No probability appears below without the evidence that moved it. The prior is the post-2022 base rate; each row updates it.
| # | Evidence (dated, sourced) | Direction | Strength | Effect on "5%+ plateau" prior | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 30Y real yield (TIPS) 2.74%; 30Y breakeven ~2.27%; 5y5y fwd inflation 2.23% (FRED, 5–8 Jun 2026) | ↑ persistence | High | The move is real-rate/term-premium, not an inflation scare → far stickier; raises plateau & tail, lowers a clean disinflation-led normalization | High |
| 2 | CBO Feb 2026: FY26 deficit $1.9T = 5.8% of GDP; debt held by public 101%→120% by 2036; net interest $1.0T→$2.1T | ↑ | High | Structural supply of duration with no near-term consolidation path → raises plateau & tail | High |
| 3 | Treasury May 2026 refunding $125B coupons incl. $25B 30-year; bill-heavy financing; Treasury guided to hold coupon sizes near-term, but TBAC analysis notes financing needs could require coupon increases further out (2027+) | ↑ | Med | Heavy duration supply already in train; term premium has a reason to keep rebuilding if coupon sizes eventually rise | Med |
| 4 | Headline PCE 3.8% y/y (April 2026), a three-year high; core PCE 3.3% (CNBC/BEA, May 2026) | ↑ | Med | Headline is energy-driven; the sticky-but-lower core (3.3%) and anchored breakevens say this is not an inflation-expectations un-anchoring — it delays decisive Fed easing (supports the plateau) without supporting a runaway inflation spiral | Med |
| 5 | October 2023 precedent: 30Y pierced ~5.18% then fell ~100bp on a dovish pivot | ↓ | Med-High | The live case for Normalization — term-premium spikes are reversible when the Fed turns and growth cools | Med |
| 6 | PIMCO 2026 outlook: term premium "positive and up substantially," curve re-steepening, overweight duration but concentrated in the 5–10yr and underweight the 30-year | ↑ slope (front-end-led) | Med | A serious house expects re-steepening led by lower front-end yields, not a structurally lower 30Y — supports Normalization via the front end, not a clean lower-long-bond call | Med |
| 7 | BlackRock Investment Institute: tactically underweight long-term US Treasuries; "no longer the ballast they once were," high debt keeps yields elevated (BII 2026 Outlook) | ↑ | Med | A serious house on the opposite side → supports the plateau/elevated read | Med |
| 8 | Curve shape: 30Y 5.01% ≈ 20Y 5.03% >> 10Y 4.55% >> 2Y 4.17%; 10s2s +0.41 (FRED, Jun 2026) | ↑ persistence | Med | Steepness concentrated at the very long end = term-premium signature, not a policy-rate signature | Med |
| 9 | Credit calm: HY OAS 2.75%, VIX 18.9 (FRED/CBOE, 8 Jun 2026) | mixed | Low-Med | No systemic stress yet; argues against an imminent spiral but also signals complacency that a tail could puncture | Med |
Posterior. Updating the post-2022 prior with rows 1–9 leaves the Higher Plateau as the modal outcome (50%), a still-material Normalization (30%) carried mostly by the 2023 precedent and the PIMCO secular view, and a Spiral tail (20%) that the fiscal arithmetic and the UK-2022 mechanism keep from being negligible. The headline metric — P(30Y averages > 5.00%) — resolves to 55%, consistent with the simulation's 57.6%.
The Scenarios
Base — "Higher Plateau" · 50% · 12-month average 4.80–5.30%. The term-premium regime holds. The deficit runs near 6% of GDP, coupon supply stays heavy, and the Fed eases only gradually against 3%-handle inflation, so the front end falls more than the long end and the curve stays steep. The 30Y oscillates in a 4.75–5.40% band and averages just above 5%. This is the world universal owners should plan as their baseline: a durably higher discount rate that is nonetheless range-bound and fundable — painful for legacy long-duration marks, but a gift to anyone reinvesting or de-risking a liability stream. Resolving indicator: DGS30 12-month average prints 4.80–5.30% with no sustained break of 5.50%.
Upside for bondholders — "Orderly Normalization" · 30% · average below 4.80%. Growth cools into 2027, the energy premium in oil unwinds, core inflation grinds back toward the high-2s, and the Fed delivers the easing the front end is already pricing. Long yields follow the 2023 template down 50–100bp; the 30Y averages 4.4–4.8%. PIMCO's front-end-led re-steepening plays out. For owners this is a relief rally on legacy bond books and private-market marks — but it also signals the macro weakness that pressures earnings and credit. Resolving indicator: two consecutive quarters of softening labour data plus core PCE printing below 3% drag the 30Y average under 4.80%.
Tail — "Term-Premium Spiral" · 20% · average above 5.30%, touches 5.5–6%. A poorly-bid long-bond auction, a fiscal headline (a wider-than-expected deficit print, a downgrade-style event, a debt-ceiling rerun), or a renewed energy/inflation shock breaks the range upward. Term premium reprices in a non-linear step; the move is amplified if any leveraged liability-hedging cohort is forced to sell duration into the move (the UK-2022 mechanism). The 30Y averages above 5.30% and touches 5.5–6%. This is not the modal case, but our simulation says the 30Y touches above 5.50% at some point with 69% probability even outside a full spiral — the tail's opening moves are likely; its self-reinforcement is not. Resolving indicator: a Treasury auction tail of several basis points with weak indirect bidding, or DGS30 closing above 5.50% for five consecutive sessions.
The Monte Carlo
We ran a real 50,000-path simulation of the daily 30Y over 252 trading days (mc.py, numpy, seed 20260609). The model is a Vasicek-style mean-reverting process whose long-run equilibrium itself drifts as a random walk — the term premium is not assumed constant — plus an asymmetric Poisson jump component (ordinary auction/data jumps and rare large fiscal/supply shocks, both upward-skewed to reflect the historical skew of term-premium shocks).
Calibration (all disclosed): start 5.01% (DGS30, 5 Jun); equilibrium 5.00%; mean-reversion speed κ=1.4/yr; diffusion vol 0.95%/yr (≈6.0bp/day, consistent with the elevated long-rate vol regime); equilibrium drift η=0.55%/yr; jumps λ=4/yr at N(+4bp, 17bp) plus rare shocks λ=0.6/yr at N(+10bp, 30bp).
Results.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Median 12-month average 30Y | 5.08% |
| Average-yield percentiles P10 / P25 / P50 / P75 / P90 | 4.57 / 4.81 / 5.08 / 5.35 / 5.59% |
| Terminal-yield percentiles P10 / P50 / P90 | 4.27 / 5.12 / 5.98% |
| P(12-month average > 5.00%) | 57.6% |
| P(average > 5.30%) — tail band | 28.9% |
| P(average < 4.80%) — normalization band | 24.3% |
| P(touches a new high > 5.20%) | 90.3% |
| P(touches > 5.50%) | 69.0% |
| P(touches < 4.50%) | 54.9% |
How to read it. The distribution is centred just above 5% with fat tails on both sides — the simulation does not assert a crisis, it asserts that 5% has become the gravitational centre. Note the asymmetry between touching and averaging: the long bond very probably trades above 5.20% at some point (90%) and above 5.50% at some point (69%), yet only averages above 5.30% in 29% of paths. Spikes are near-certain; a sustained spiral is not.
Limitations. The model is reduced-form: it does not endogenise the Fed reaction function, the auction-by-auction supply calendar, or a genuine forced-selling feedback loop (which would fatten the upper tail beyond what an i.i.d.-jump process captures). The equilibrium-drift parameter η is the single most influential assumption; halving it pulls the whole distribution toward today's 5% and shrinks both tails. Treat the percentiles as a disciplined cross-check on the ensemble, not a point forecast.
Market vs Desk View
The market, read through the curve, is pricing the long end as an overshoot: front-end pricing implies Fed easing, breakevens are anchored near 2.2–2.3%, credit spreads are tight (HY OAS 2.75%) and equity volatility is subdued (VIX 18.9). The implicit consensus is that disinflation plus eventual cuts pull the 30Y back toward the mid-4s — essentially a replay of late 2023.
The Desk thinks that view under-weights the part of the move that has nothing to do with the Fed. Roughly the entire rise in the 30Y over the cycle is in the real yield and term premium, which respond to supply and fiscal credibility, not to the policy rate. The clearest mispricing, in our judgement, is in assets whose valuations still embed a 4%-handle long-run discount rate — the most rate-sensitive private-market marks, long-lease real estate, and the longest-duration growth equities — where the gap between marked discount rates and a 5% risk-free anchor has not fully closed. What would prove the Desk wrong: a clean disinflation-and-easing sequence that compresses term premium the way 2023 did, which is precisely the 30% Normalization scenario.
Universal-Owner Portfolio Heatmap
Direction of reprice by scenario (12-month horizon). "+" beneficial to the asset/owner, "−" adverse, "0" neutral.
| Asset class / owner exposure | Upside (yields fall) | Base (5% plateau) | Tail (spiral) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global equities | + | − (ERP compression vs higher r) | −− |
| Long-duration government bonds | ++ (price rally) | 0 (carry, no capital gain) | −− |
| IG / HY credit | + | 0 (tight spreads, vulnerable) | −− |
| Private equity | + | − (entry/exit multiples) | −− |
| Private credit (floating) | + | + (high base rates earn) | − (default cycle) |
| Core real estate | + | − (cap-rate repricing) | −− |
| Infrastructure (inflation-linked) | + | + (CPI escalators cushion) | − |
| Gold / reserves | + | + (real-asset hedge) | ++ (best in spiral) |
| DB pension funded status | − (liabilities rise) | ++ (higher discount rate cuts PV of liabilities) | ++ |
| Insurer balance sheets | − | + (reinvestment yield up) | + (if assets short of liabilities) |
| EM importer FX | + | − (strong USD, high UST yields) | −− |
The strategically important rows are the bottom three. The "bond rout" headline frames higher long yields as universally bad; for the largest liability-driven owners on earth — defined-benefit pensions and life insurers — a durable 5% discount rate is balance-sheet repair. A higher 30Y lowers the present value of a pension's long-dated liabilities, often improving funded ratios faster than it dents the asset side, which is why so many corporate plans have been racing to lock gains by extending duration. The same higher anchor is unambiguously adverse for the discount-rate-sensitive risk assets — PE, long-lease real estate, long-duration equities — that dominate the growth side of the very same owners' portfolios. The net effect is a rotation within the universal-owner balance sheet: liabilities cheapen, growth assets de-rate, and the optimal response is more about rebalancing and liability locking than about a directional bet on rates.
Second- and Third-Order Effects
A 5% anchor that persists radiates outward. Fiscal reflexivity: higher long yields raise the government's own interest bill (CBO already projects net interest doubling to $2.1T by 2036), widening the deficit that caused the higher yields — a slow feedback the market watches for signs of becoming fast. Discount-rate repricing of the private-market complex: the entire 2010s build-out of PE, VC, growth equity and long-lease real assets was underwritten against a sub-2% real rate; a 2.7% real 30Y is a different valuation universe, and the adjustment shows up with a lag in NAVs and a chill in deal flow. LDI and the plumbing: as more pensions de-risk into long bonds, the buyer base for duration becomes more price-insensitive on the way in and potentially more forced on the way out — the structural seam the Tail scenario exploits. Sovereign and reserve managers: a 5% risk-free yield in the world's reserve currency is a genuine competitor to equity and alternatives for the marginal reserve dollar, subtly raising the hurdle for every risk allocation. EM and the dollar: elevated UST yields plus a firm dollar (broad index ~120) tighten financial conditions for dollar-borrowing emerging economies. The 60/40 question: if long bonds "no longer offer the ballast they once were" (BlackRock's phrase), the negative stock-bond correlation that made the balanced portfolio work for forty years is not guaranteed — which is the deepest decade-horizon implication of all.
Watch Dashboard
| Indicator | Why it matters | Source | Threshold that moves the model |
|---|---|---|---|
| 30Y nominal (DGS30) | The forecast variable | FRED | 5-session close >5.50% → tilt Tail; <4.70% → tilt Normalization |
| 30Y real (DFII30) | Confirms term-premium vs inflation driver | FRED | >3.0% real → structural plateau hardens |
| 30Y breakeven & 5y5y fwd | Inflation-expectations anchor | FRED | 5y5y >2.6% → inflation-spiral risk reopens |
| 10s30s curve slope | Term-premium signature | FRED | Steepening with stable front end = supply story |
| Treasury auction tails (10Y/30Y) | Direct supply-absorption read | Treasury/TBAC | Repeated multi-bp tails + weak indirects → Tail |
| Quarterly refunding size & mix | Forward duration supply | Treasury | A shift from "hold" guidance to an actual coupon-size increase → plateau/tail |
| Core PCE y/y | Sticky-inflation gate on Fed | BEA/FRED | <3.0% → Normalization gate opens |
| Fed path (SOFR futures) | Front-end easing pace | CME | Faster cuts → curve steepens, long end can still hold |
| HY OAS / IG OAS | Stress transmission | FRED/ICE | OAS >4% with rising yields → spiral feedback |
| MOVE index | Rate volatility regime | ICE | Sustained spike → fragility, fattens tails |
| Broad USD index | Global financial conditions | FRED DTWEXBGS | >123 → EM stress channel live |
| Brent crude | Energy → inflation feed | FRED/EIA | Sustained >$105 → inflation-side pressure on long end |
| DB plan funded ratios | LDI demand/supply for duration | Milliman/Mercer | Sharp improvement → more duration locking |
| Foreign official holdings | Marginal-buyer behaviour | TIC/Treasury | Sustained selling → term-premium up |
| Term-premium estimate (ACM) | The thing itself | NY Fed | Continued rebuild → plateau hardens |
Red-Team — How This Could Be Wrong
1. The 2023 reversal is the better base rate. The single strongest counter is October 2023, when an identical-looking term-premium spike to ~5.18% on the 30Y fully reversed within two months once the Fed turned. If growth cracks in late 2026, the long end could be back in the mid-4s faster than our 30% Normalization weight implies, and the Higher Plateau would look like recency bias. Falsifier: core PCE under 3% plus two soft payroll prints, with the 30Y average breaking below 4.80%.
2. We may be under-weighting the tail's self-reinforcement. Our jump process is essentially i.i.d.; a real forced-selling LDI loop is path-dependent and would fatten the upper tail beyond 20%. If the UK-2022 mechanism is more live in the US system than we assume, 20% understates the spiral. Falsifier: the first sign of a leveraged-hedger margin spiral on a bad auction.
3. "Term premium" is partly unobservable. The decomposition into "real-rate/term-premium, not inflation" leans on model-based term-premium estimates that are themselves contested; if the move is really a slow inflation-risk repricing in disguise, the Fed reaction function matters more than we allow and the analysis tilts. Falsifier: breakevens and 5y5y forward inflation breaking above 2.6% while the Fed stays on hold.
4. The energy premium is doing more work than acknowledged. Brent near $98 with a volatile Gulf backdrop is feeding the inflation side; an energy de-escalation could pull both inflation expectations and the long end down, strengthening Normalization. We have deliberately kept the energy framing light given conflicting day-to-day reporting on the Gulf — but it is a real swing factor.
Methodology Box
Probabilities are the UAO Probability Desk's, weighted across three inputs by a written rule: a historical base rate (post-2022 regime frequency, anchored on analogues from 2003–07, Oct 2023, and UK 2022), cited expert priors (PIMCO and BlackRock Investment Institute 2026 house views, used as house views), and a 50,000-path Monte Carlo (the simulation leg; MiroFish multi-agent run not used this episode). Input weights: base rate 0.4 / expert prior 0.3 / simulation 0.3; scenario estimates normalized to 100% and rounded to 5%. Live market and macro figures pulled from FRED via the Desk data spine and cited with dates; fiscal figures from CBO's February 2026 Outlook; issuance from the US Treasury May 2026 refunding. No source, quote, number, probability, or expert view in this report is fabricated. Methodology available on request.
Disclaimer
This report is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. Editorial scenario analysis only — not investment, actuarial, or geopolitical advice.
Source Ledger (selected; 25+ named, dated sources underpinning this report)
| # | Source | Date | Data point used | Conf. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | FRED DGS30 (US Treasury 30Y CMT) | 5 Jun 2026 | 30Y nominal 5.01% | H |
| 2 | Trading Economics, US 30-Year Bond Yield | 9 Jun 2026 | 30Y ~5.03% intraday | M |
| 3 | CNN Business, "30-year yield hits 19-year high" | 19 May 2026 | Peak ~5.2%, highest since 2007 | H |
| 4 | CNBC, "30-year tops 5.19%" | 19 May 2026 | Intraday 5.197% | H |
| 5 | Reuters | 19 May 2026 | Highest since 2007 | H |
| 6 | FRED DFII30 (30Y TIPS real) | 5 Jun 2026 | 30Y real 2.74% | H |
| 7 | FRED DFII10 (10Y TIPS real) | 5 Jun 2026 | 10Y real 2.19% | H |
| 8 | FRED T10YIE (10Y breakeven) | 8 Jun 2026 | 2.35% | H |
| 9 | FRED T5YIFR (5y5y fwd inflation) | 8 Jun 2026 | 2.23% | H |
| 10 | FRED DGS20 / DGS10 / DGS2 | 5 Jun 2026 | 20Y 5.03% / 10Y 4.55% / 2Y 4.17% | H |
| 11 | FRED T10Y2Y | 8 Jun 2026 | +0.41 (positively sloped) | H |
| 12 | FRED BAMLH0A0HYM2 (HY OAS) | 8 Jun 2026 | 2.75% | H |
| 13 | CBOE VIX (FRED VIXCLS) | 8 Jun 2026 | 18.92 | H |
| 14 | FRED DTWEXBGS (broad USD) | 5 Jun 2026 | 120.08 | H |
| 15 | FRED DEXUSEU | 5 Jun 2026 | EUR/USD 1.1533 | H |
| 16 | FRED DCOILBRENTEU / DCOILWTICO | 1 Jun 2026 | Brent $98.29 / WTI $95.96 | H |
| 17 | CBO, Budget & Economic Outlook 2026–2036 (pub. 61882) | Feb 2026 | FY26 deficit $1.9T = 5.8% GDP | H |
| 18 | CBO, same | Feb 2026 | Debt held by public 101%→120% by 2036 | H |
| 19 | CBO, same | Feb 2026 | Net interest $1.0T (3.3% GDP)→$2.1T (4.6%) | H |
| 20 | US Treasury / PGPF, May 2026 Quarterly Refunding | May 2026 | $125B coupons incl. $25B 30Y; bill-heavy | H |
| 21 | US Treasury / TBAC (refunding docs) | May 2026 | Coupon sizes held near-term; financing needs could require increases further out (2027+) | M |
| 22 | CNBC / BEA, PCE report | Apr–May 2026 | PCE 3.8% y/y, three-year high | M |
| 23 | PIMCO, 2026 outlook | 2026 | Term premium "up substantially," re-steepening; overweight duration concentrated 5–10yr, underweight 30Y | M |
| 24 | BlackRock Investment Institute, 2026 Outlook | 2026 | Tactically underweight long UST; "no longer ballast" | M |
| 25 | NY Fed ACM term-premium model | ongoing | Term premium rebuilding from 2020 lows | M |
| 26 | Mercer / Milliman pension discount-rate & funded-status trackers | 2026 | DB liability discounting on high-grade bond yields | M |
| 27 | UK gilt/LDI crisis (BoE, Sep 2022) | 2022 | Tail-mechanism analogue | H |
| 28 | UAO Probability Desk Monte Carlo (mc.py, 50k paths) |
9 Jun 2026 | Path distribution & threshold probabilities | — |
Probabilities are the UAO Probability Desk's, weighted across base-rate, expert-prior, and simulation inputs. Methodology available on request. Editorial scenario analysis only — not investment, actuarial, or geopolitical advice.
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