The Probability Desk — Friday, May 29, 2026
Base cases. Tail risks. Second-order effects. For capital that thinks in decades.
Desk View, in one paragraph
The Strait of Hormuz has now been effectively closed to tanker traffic for roughly three months — the largest supply shock in the history of the global crude market, with more than 14 million barrels per day of Gulf output shut in and over a billion barrels of cumulative supply lost. The market has stopped treating this as a crisis. Brent sits near $103, the futures curve and the major banks point toward the high-$80s by the fourth quarter, equity volatility is asleep at 16, and high-yield credit spreads are a complacent 271 basis points. The single question that reprices everything is not whether Hormuz reopens but when — and the events of the last twenty-four hours, a tentative U.S.–Iran agreement that the U.S. President has not signed, contradicted the same day by fresh American strikes inside Iran and an Iranian ballistic missile fired toward Kuwait, are exactly the conditions under which reopening timelines slip. The Probability Desk weights a phased reopening as the base case (50%), a fast clean normalization as the upside (30%), and a re-escalation that drags the closure into 2027 as the tail (20%). The base case is close to consensus. The tail is not. A one-in-five chance that this shock is still gripping markets at year-end, and a roughly one-in-six chance that 4Q26 Brent averages above $130, is not a risk that a VIX of 16 or a 271-basis-point credit spread is paying anyone to hold.
The Trigger
On Wednesday and Thursday, May 27–28, 2026, the U.S. military carried out a new round of strikes inside Iran, hitting an Iranian drone-launch site near the Strait of Hormuz — in the area of the port of Bandar Abbas, per a U.S. official — and shooting down a cluster of Iranian drones — strikes a U.S. official characterized as defensive against threats to American forces and commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz Reuters via Liveuamap, May 27–28, 2026; CBS News, May 28, 2026. Iran called the strikes a violation of the shaky ceasefire and launched retaliatory fire; U.S. Central Command said Iran fired a ballistic missile toward Kuwait early Thursday local time Bloomberg, May 28, 2026.
The same day, CNN reported that Washington and Tehran had reached a tentative agreement to end the three-month war — a deal the U.S. President had not yet signed off on CNN live coverage, May 28, 2026. The war began on February 28, 2026 with U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran; it has killed thousands and shut the Strait of Hormuz to normal traffic for the duration.
That is the knife-edge. A negotiated end to the war is closer than at any point since February — and live fire is still being exchanged across the chokepoint that carries roughly a fifth of the world's oil. The trigger is not a single event; it is the collision of a peace process and a re-escalation on the same date, which is precisely what makes the reopening timeline so hard to price.
The Forecast Question
When do Strait of Hormuz oil flows return to roughly pre-war levels, and where does Brent average in the fourth quarter of 2026?
- Resolution — reopening: AIS-tracked transits sustain ≥100 vessels/day (against a ~138/day pre-war norm) and Gulf shut-in volumes fall below ~2 mb/d, held for at least two consecutive weeks.
- Resolution — price: the average 4Q26 (Oct–Dec) Brent print, graded against the bands below.
- Horizon: through December 31, 2026, with a decade-horizon repricing overlay.
- What would change the call: a signed, verified, durable ceasefire (pulls toward upside) or a confirmed attack on Gulf oil infrastructure or the mining of the Strait (pulls toward tail).
This is a deliberately gradeable question. We will mark it in the public calibration log when the quarter closes.
Prior & Base Rate
The outside view starts with a simple historical fact: the Strait of Hormuz has never before been fully closed to traffic for a sustained period, and Middle East oil-supply shocks have historically mean-reverted within weeks to months.
- The 1984–88 "Tanker War." During the Iran–Iraq war, roughly 450 ships were attacked in and around the Gulf, yet the Strait stayed open: convoying and reflagging (the U.S. Operation Earnest Will) kept oil moving. Implies: chokepoints are extraordinarily resilient even under sustained attack — a strong prior toward reopening.
- September 2019, Abqaiq. Drone and missile strikes knocked out ~5.7 mb/d of Saudi processing — roughly half the kingdom's output and ~5% of global supply. Brent spiked ~15% in a single session and round-tripped within weeks as Saudi Aramco restored throughput faster than expected. Implies: the market systematically over-discounts the speed of supply repair.
- March 2022, Russia–Ukraine. Brent spiked to ~$130 on the invasion, then faded within roughly three months even as physical rerouting took close to a year. Implies: even a genuinely structural shock sees its acute price premium decay on a one- to two-quarter horizon, leaving a smaller standing premium behind.
A naïve reading of those analogues would put the probability of reopening within three months near 70–80% and the sustained-closure tail near 10–15%.
But the current episode is a regime break, and we log it as such. Hormuz has already been effectively closed for ~three months — longer than any historical precedent — with more than 14 mb/d shut in and cumulative losses exceeding a billion barrels IEA Oil Market Report, May 2026. The base rate was built on shocks that never actually closed the Strait. This one did. That structural break is the documented reason the Desk pulls its base case below the naïve frequency (to 50%) and lifts its tail above it (to 20%).
Evidence-Update Table (Bayesian)
We start from the historical prior and update only on dated, sourced evidence. No probability moves without the evidence beside it.
| Step | Evidence (dated, sourced) | Direction | Strength | Running read on the tail (sustained closure / Q4 Brent ≥ $115) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prior | Historical chokepoint shocks mean-revert in weeks–months; Strait never sustained-closed (1984–88, 2019, 2022) | — | — | ~12% |
| +1 | Strait already closed ~3 months; >14.4 mb/d Gulf output below pre-war; >1bn bbl lost (IEA OMR, May 2026) | ↑ tail | High | ~22% |
| +2 | North Sea Dated averaged $120.36 in April, a ~$50/bbl monthly range (IEA OMR, May 2026) | ↑ tail | Med | ~24% |
| +3 | EIA assumes flows gradually resume from June, normalization late-2026/early-2027; 4Q26 Brent $89 (EIA STEO, May 2026) | ↓ tail | High | ~19% |
| +4 | Goldman pushes normalization to end-June, Q4 Brent $90; $120 Q3 if closure persists another month (Goldman Sachs, Apr–May 2026) | ↓ tail (mild) | Med | ~18% |
| +5 | OPEC+ adds 188 kbpd for June; UAE exit (May 1) frees barrels outside the Strait; Saudi/UAE rerouting some exports (OPEC, May 3; IEA) | ↓ tail | Med | ~16% |
| +6 | May 28: fresh U.S. strikes in Iran, Iranian missile toward Kuwait, ceasefire called violated (Bloomberg/CBS/CNN) | ↑ tail | High | ~21% |
| +7 | Same day: tentative U.S.–Iran agreement, unsigned (CNN, May 28) | ↓ tail | Med | ~20% |
| Posterior | ~20% tail / 50% base / 30% upside |
The two May 28 data points very nearly cancel: a peace deal is on the table, and it is being shot at. That is why the Desk lands with an elevated but not dominant tail.
The Scenarios
Three mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive scenarios, defined on the gradeable 4Q26 Brent outcome. Weights are read off the 50,000-path simulation below (rounded to 5%); they sum to 100%.
Base — Phased reopening, Brent fades · 50%
The tentative agreement is eventually signed and broadly holds despite intermittent flare-ups. Tanker transits climb back through the summer; Gulf shut-in falls below 2 mb/d during the third quarter; war-risk premiums bleed off. Brent averages the high-$80s to low-$90s in 4Q26, converging on the EIA's $89 and Goldman's $90. This is close to consensus and to the futures curve. Trigger: a signed deal plus verified de-escalation. Tripwire: fourteen consecutive days without a cross-border strike; AIS transits sustaining above ~50/day by July; war-risk premiums falling back toward 0.5% of hull value.
Upside — Fast, clean normalization · 30%
The ceasefire is signed quickly and holds cleanly. Reopening is faster than the banks assume; the post-UAE OPEC+ adds barrels into a demand backdrop the IEA has already marked down by 420 kbpd for 2026. Strategic-storage releases and rerouted Gulf exports accelerate the unwind. Brent slips below $85 and trends toward the high-$70s — pulling the 2027 path (JPM $75, EIA $79) forward into late 2026. Trigger: signed deal, verified Iranian stand-down, insurers re-entering at scale. Tripwire: war-risk premiums toward pre-war 0.1–0.15%; transits above 100/day by August; Brent's prompt spread flipping decisively into contango.
Tail — Re-escalation / sustained closure into 2027 · 20%
The May 28 strikes and the missile toward Kuwait are the leading edge of a ceasefire collapse rather than noise around a deal. Hormuz stays largely shut into 2027; the shock that the EIA itself concedes may take "late 2026 or early 2027" to normalize instead deepens. Brent averages at or above $115 in 4Q26, with a live path toward JPM's $150 overshoot — and our simulation puts a ~16% probability on a 4Q26 average above $130. Trigger: sustained attacks on shipping or Gulf oil infrastructure, mining of the Strait, or a strike that pulls in a Gulf producer directly. Tripwire: ballistic strikes on Gulf bases or export terminals; war-risk underwriters withdrawing cover entirely; transits stuck below 20/day through July.
The Monte Carlo
We ran a 50,000-path simulation (mc.py, numpy, seed 20260529). We do not draw the answer; we draw the drivers — ceasefire durability → reopening date → the fraction of the fourth quarter still disrupted → price — and let the distribution emerge. The published scenario weights above are read off the simulated price outcomes, not imposed.
Design. Each path is assigned a ceasefire-durability regime (fast / phased / re-escalate, prior 15% / 50% / 35%). A reopening date D is drawn per regime (triangular distributions for the de-escalation regimes, calibrated to the EIA/IEA "flows resume from June" and Goldman "end-June" anchors; a right-skewed lognormal centered in 2027 for re-escalation, reflecting the unprecedented three-month closure). D maps to the share of 4Q26 still disrupted, with a 30-day post-reopening normalization lag for premiums and insurance. That share drives a 4Q26 Brent built from a normalized level (~$86, anchored to EIA/Goldman) plus a convex war-premium term (April's realized ~$120 vs. ~$85 normalized implies a ~$35 premium; severe persistence supports a larger one), plus quarter-average noise.
Results.
| Output | P10 | P25 | P50 | P75 | P90 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reopening date (days from May 29) | 36 | 69 | 101 | 179 | 298 |
| 4Q26 average Brent (USD/bbl) | $80 | $84 | $90 | $107 | $143 |
- Median reopening ≈ 101 days — early September. Probability of reopening before Q4 begins: 63.7%. Probability the disruption is still live entering 2027: 19.5%.
- 4Q26 Brent: mean $100.5, median $90. P(Q4 avg > $100) = 29%; P(> $115) = 22% (which rounds to the published 20% tail weight); P(> $130) = 16%; P(< $85) = 28%.
Limitations. The regime priors are analytic, not market-implied; the price-vs-disruption map is a reduced-form calibration to cited anchors, not a structural supply-demand model; the simulation cannot price a discontinuous event (a mined Strait, a direct hit on Ras Tanura) beyond fattening the right tail. It is a disciplined way to turn a reopening-timing view into a price distribution — not a forecast of any single path.
Market Pricing vs. Desk View
Here is the heart of the call. Markets are pricing a clean resolution.
- Brent sits at $102.75 (FRED DCOILBRENTEU, May 26) with the curve and the banks pointing to ~$89–90 by 4Q26 (EIA STEO May 2026; Goldman). That is squarely the Desk's base case.
- Equity volatility — the VIX closed at 16.29 (FRED VIXCLS, May 27). That is a calm-markets reading during the largest crude supply shock on record.
- Credit — U.S. high-yield spreads are 271 basis points (FRED BAMLH0A0HYM2, May 27), historically tight and nowhere near pricing an oil-driven growth scare.
- Rates — the 10-year is 4.48%, the 30-year 5.01%, with 10-year breakevens at just 2.39% (FRED, May 27–28). The bond market is not pricing a sustained energy-inflation impulse either.
Put together, the cross-asset tape implies the market assigns the base-plus-upside outcome roughly 85–90% and the tail something like 5–10%. The Desk puts the tail at 20% — and a ~16% probability on a 4Q26 average above $130. That is the mispricing: implied volatility and credit are not compensating holders for the re-escalation risk that the May 28 strikes just demonstrated is live. The single highest-conviction expression of the Desk view is therefore not a directional oil bet — it is that convexity is cheap: energy-sector and oil-linked optionality, and tail hedges in credit, are priced for a resolution that the same week's headlines are actively contesting.
What would prove the Desk wrong: a signed, verified, durable ceasefire within roughly two weeks, with transits climbing past 50/day by July. We are watching for exactly that.
Universal-Owner Portfolio Heatmap
Direction of the reprice by asset class under each scenario, on a 3-month and 12-month view. Strategic, not advisory.
| Asset class | Base (50%) | Upside (30%) | Tail (20%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global equities (broad) | Flat → mild + | + | – to – – |
| Energy / oil majors & services | Mild – (premium fades) | – | + + |
| Utilities / power | Flat | Flat → + | – (fuel-cost drag) |
| Infrastructure / midstream / storage | + | Flat | + + (scarcity value) |
| Shipping / tankers | – (rates normalize) | – – | + + (day-rates spike) |
| Airlines / transport | + | + + | – – |
| Chemicals / fertilizer | Flat | + | – – (feedstock) |
| Defense / dual-use | + | Flat | + + |
| Inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) | Flat | – | + + |
| Long-duration nominal bonds | + (yields ease) | + | – – (inflation premium) |
| Gulf sovereign / GCC equity & credit | + | + | + (revenue) but ↑ political risk |
| EM oil importers (FX, credit) | + | + + | – – (current-account & FX stress) |
| Insurance / reinsurance | Flat | + | – (war-risk losses, exclusions) |
| Private credit / PE marks | Flat | + | – (lagged repricing, energy-exposed) |
| Gold / reserves | Flat | – | + + |
| Broad commodities | Flat | – | + + |
The asymmetry is the point: most of the book is roughly flat-to-positive in the base and upside, and several large exposures are sharply negative in the tail. That is the shape of a portfolio that is long a clean resolution whether or not its owners intended to be.
Second- and Third-Order Effects
- Gulf sovereign firepower, two ways. Sustained high prices swell GCC sovereign-wealth inflows even as the Strait throttles their physical exports — Saudi Arabia and the UAE are already rerouting some barrels to terminals outside Hormuz (IEA). A longer closure accelerates the decade-long strategic logic of bypass infrastructure (the East–West pipeline, Fujairah, Red Sea and overland routes) and hands pricing power to producers with non-Hormuz egress.
- The UAE's OPEC exit compounds the regime change. The May 1 departure — and the first post-UAE OPEC+ decision to add 188 kbpd for June, with the group meeting again June 7 — means the cartel's supply response is now being set by a smaller, less cohesive group precisely as the market most needs a credible swing producer. Fractured coordination raises the long-run oil risk premium that universal owners must embed, independent of where spot settles this quarter.
- EM importers absorb the tail. A $130-plus quarter lands hardest on oil-importing emerging markets through current-account and currency channels — the classic transmission that turns an energy shock into an EM credit and FX event. The yen, already at 159 to the dollar, sits in the crosshairs of any sustained energy-import bill.
- The insurance layer is the real chokepoint. War-risk premiums that ran to double-digit millions of dollars per VLCC voyage — versus a pre-war 0.1–0.15% of hull value — are the mechanism that keeps the Strait shut even when shooting pauses (Lloyd's List; Insurance Business, 2026). Reopening is gated less by ceasefires than by underwriters re-entering, which is why war-risk pricing is on the Watch Dashboard.
- Energy-transition capital, repriced. A protracted shock strengthens the security-of-supply case for domestic gas, nuclear, and grid build-out — and the AI-data-center power story rides directly on that fuel-cost curve. The long-horizon owner's transition thesis is path-dependent on how this resolves.
What We're Watching — the Dashboard
| # | Indicator | Why it matters | Threshold that moves the model |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hormuz AIS transits (vessels/day) | The cleanest reopening signal; ~138 pre-war → 5–6 early May | >50/day = base on track; >100 = upside; <20 through July = tail |
| 2 | Gulf shut-in volume (mb/d) | >14 mb/d off-line today (IEA) | <2 mb/d sustained = reopening confirmed |
| 3 | War-risk insurance premium (% hull) | Gates physical reopening; ~1% now vs 0.1–0.15% pre-war | Toward 0.5% = base; toward pre-war = upside; withdrawal = tail |
| 4 | VLCC day-rates ($/day) | Spiked toward ~$770k from strikes | Falling toward normal = de-escalation |
| 5 | Brent spot & prompt spread | $102.75 (May 26); backwardation = scarcity | Slide < $90 = base/upside; > $115 sustained = tail |
| 6 | Signed (not tentative) U.S.–Iran agreement | The single largest swing factor | A signed, verified deal = upside catalyst |
| 7 | Strikes on Gulf oil infrastructure | The discontinuous tail trigger | Any confirmed hit on export terminals = tail |
| 8 | OPEC+ June 7 decision | Post-UAE supply response | A larger-than-188kbpd add = disinflationary |
| 9 | U.S. HY credit spread (bps) | 271 now — complacency gauge | >400 = market repricing the tail |
| 10 | VIX | 16.29 now | >25 = volatility waking to the shock |
| 11 | 10-yr breakeven inflation | 2.39% now | >2.8% = energy-inflation impulse pricing in |
| 12 | EM importer FX (esp. JPY, INR) | JPY at 159 | Sharp depreciation = tail transmission live |
| 13 | Strategic-reserve releases | Offsetting losses now (IEA) | Exhaustion/refill signals the turn |
| 14 | Gold | Reserve-hedge bid | New highs = tail being hedged |
Red-Team — How This Could Be Wrong
- The base rate could simply reassert. Every prior Middle East oil shock mean-reverted faster than the consensus feared. If Abqaiq and 2022 are the right guide, our 20% tail is too high and reopening lands closer to the P25 (~ten weeks). The honest counter: those shocks never actually closed the Strait, so the reference class may not apply — but if it does, we are over-weighting the tail.
- A signed deal could arrive within days. The tentative agreement is real. If the President signs and Iran stands down, the upside (30%) is the live case and Brent could be in the $70s by Q4 — below even our P25.
- We may be under-modeling the discontinuous tail. Our simulation fattens the right tail but cannot price a mined Strait or a direct strike on Ras Tanura/Fujairah. If that is the true risk, a $130 average understates it; the real tail is a $180+ spike the model only grazes.
- The market may know something we don't. A VIX of 16 and 271bp credit during a record supply shock is either complacency or information — back-channel confidence that the deal holds. We read it as complacency; we could be reading insiders' calm as naïveté.
What would falsify the call within a week: a signed, verified ceasefire with transits past 50/day by mid-June would invalidate the elevated tail and pull the distribution decisively toward base-and-upside.
Methodology. Probabilities are the UAO Probability Desk's, weighted across base-rate, expert-prior, and multi-agent-simulation inputs (MiroFish: unavailable this run; two-input ensemble of base-rate 0.55 / expert-prior 0.45, with weights read off a 50,000-path Monte Carlo). Live market data from FRED (DCOILBRENTEU, DGS10/2/30, VIXCLS, BAMLH0A0HYM2, T10YIE), as of May 26–28, 2026. Full methodology available on request.
Editorial scenario analysis only. Not investment, actuarial, or geopolitical advice.
Source Ledger
Selected primary and institutional sources behind today's report (40 cited). Confidence: H/M/L.
| # | Source | Date | Data point used | Conf. | Moves model? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook | May 2026 | Brent ~$106 May–Jun, $89 4Q26, FY26 $95, 2027 $79; Hormuz reopen late-May/early-Jun | H | Yes (base anchor) |
| 2 | IEA Oil Market Report | May 2026 | >14 mb/d shut in; Gulf −14.4 mb/d; >1bn bbl lost; N. Sea Dated avg $120.36 Apr; demand −420 kbpd | H | Yes |
| 3 | Goldman Sachs (Bloomberg) | Apr–May 2026 | Q4 Brent $90; $120 Q3 if closure persists; "largest supply shock in crude history"; ~20% supply stranded | H | Yes |
| 4 | J.P. Morgan (TheStreet) | May 2026 | Brent FY26 $96, 2027 $75; "overshoot toward $150" if the Strait stays effectively shut beyond an early-summer reopening | M | Yes |
| 5 | Bloomberg — US strikes near Hormuz | May 28 2026 | Fresh US strikes; no accord; Iran missile toward Kuwait | H | Yes (trigger) |
| 6 | CBS News — new strikes on Iranian site | May 28 2026 | Strike on Bandar Abbas ground-control station; 4 drones downed | H | Yes (trigger) |
| 7 | CNN — tentative US–Iran agreement | May 28 2026 | Tentative deal, unsigned by President; Iran missile toward Kuwait | H | Yes (trigger) |
| 8 | Liveuamap (Reuters cited) | May 27–28 2026 | Strikes + drone interceptions; threat to commercial traffic | M | Yes |
| 9 | Military Times — new strikes in Iran | May 28 2026 | Confirms strike on military site | M | Context |
| 10 | CNBC — OPEC+ +188 kbpd, first meeting w/o UAE | May 3 2026 | June output +188 kbpd; UAE exit | H | Yes |
| 11 | The National — OPEC June output / UAE exit | May 3 2026 | Per-country June quotas; UAE departure | M | Context |
| 12 | OPEC press release | May 3 2026 | Official statement on adjustment | H | Context |
| 13 | Lloyd's List — Gulf war-risk premiums | 2026 | Premiums to double-digit $m/voyage; transits ~138/day → 5–6 | H | Yes |
| 14 | Insurance Business — war-risk cover in the Gulf | 2026 | VLCC war-risk 2.5% (5% nexus); $10–14m/voyage; eased to ~1% (8× pre-war) | M | Yes |
| 15 | Caixin — war-risk insurance returns to Hormuz | Mar 7 2026 | Cover returns at elevated price | M | Context |
| 16 | WEF — Hormuz insurance market | Apr 2026 | Governments as insurers of last resort | M | Context |
| 17 | Strauss Center — Hormuz insurance market | 2026 | Structural background on transit insurance | L | Context |
| 18 | Fortune — current price of oil | May 28 2026 | Brent ~$97.5 intraday May 28; US–Iran driver | M | Context |
| 19 | FRED DCOILBRENTEU | May 26 2026 | Brent $102.75 | H | Yes |
| 20 | FRED DCOILWTICO | May 26 2026 | WTI $97.63 | H | Yes |
| 21 | FRED DGS10 | May 27 2026 | US 10-yr 4.48% | H | Yes |
| 22 | FRED DGS2 | May 27 2026 | US 2-yr 4.00% | H | Context |
| 23 | FRED DGS30 | May 27 2026 | US 30-yr 5.01% | H | Yes |
| 24 | FRED DFF | May 27 2026 | Fed funds 3.62% | H | Context |
| 25 | FRED T10YIE | May 28 2026 | 10-yr breakeven 2.39% | H | Yes |
| 26 | FRED T5YIE | May 28 2026 | 5-yr breakeven 2.54% | H | Context |
| 27 | FRED VIXCLS | May 27 2026 | VIX 16.29 | H | Yes (mispricing) |
| 28 | FRED BAMLH0A0HYM2 | May 27 2026 | HY OAS 271 bps | H | Yes (mispricing) |
| 29 | FRED DHHNGSP | May 26 2026 | Henry Hub $3.10 | H | Context |
| 30 | FRED DEXJPUS | May 22 2026 | USD/JPY 159.2 | H | Yes (EM/FX) |
| 31 | FRED DTWEXBGS | May 22 2026 | Broad USD 119.29 | M | Context |
| 32 | FRED CPIAUCSL | Apr 2026 | CPI index 332.41 | M | Context |
| 33 | Historical — 1984–88 Tanker War | 1984–88 | ~450 ships attacked; Strait stayed open | H | Base rate |
| 34 | Historical — Abqaiq attack | Sep 2019 | ~5.7 mb/d knocked out; Brent round-tripped in weeks | H | Base rate |
| 35 | Historical — Russia/Ukraine oil spike | Mar 2022 | Brent ~$130 then faded in ~3 months | H | Base rate |
| 36 | Historical — 1990 Gulf War | 1990–91 | Oil ~doubled then fell post-Desert Storm | M | Base rate |
| 37 | EIA press release | May 12 2026 | Updated forecast amid Mideast disruption | M | Context |
| 38 | Interfax — 7 members +188 kbpd | May 3 2026 | Confirms June quota increase | L | Context |
| 39 | NBC News — strikes on Iranian drones | May 28 2026 | Drone interceptions confirmed | M | Context |
| 40 | UAO Probability Desk Monte Carlo (mc.py) |
May 29 2026 | 50,000-path reopening/price simulation | H | Yes (weights) |
Probabilities are the UAO Probability Desk's, weighted across base-rate, expert-prior, and multi-agent-simulation inputs. Methodology available on request. Editorial scenario analysis only — not investment, actuarial, or geopolitical advice.
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